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The purpose of this thesis was to improve combat blood
requirements forecasting techniques used by Navy medical units
in support of Marine Corps elements, and to apply artificial
intelligence techniques in computerizing the process.
Prototyping methodology was used to develop an expert support
system named HEMOS (Hematologic Expert Support System for
Marine Corps Operational S_upport). The prototype system was
tested and compared with state of the art manual techniques.
The HEMOS estimate varied from actual blood requirements by
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Current naval and military organizations maintain medical
support elements within their tables of organization to tend to
the sick and wounded of their respective combat forces. These
medical units perform many different tasks in fulfilling their
mission which may be classified into two functional categories:
medical care delivery and medical logistics. Medical care
delivery includes tasks directly affecting the individual
patient's condition (e.g., performing surgery). Medical
logistics provides the means to perform medical care delivery
(e.g., providing consumable supplies). Both facets of medical
support require administrative oversite to perform the four
classic functions of all management: Planning, Leading,
Organizing, and Controlling [Ref. 1: p. 17]. This thesis will
concentrate on the planning function as practiced in the
conflict environment.
Historically, tactical medical planning for the Marine
Corps has been performed at the unit level by the Medical
Support Operations Center (MSOC) [Ref. 2]. The MSOC would use
local historical data and guidance from higher commands in
formulating estimates of requirements.
Recently, efforts have been made to elevate medical
planning above the tactical force. Several systems are in
development which would utilize a centralized control point to
estimate medical requirements. The Deployable Medical System
(DEPMEDS), for example, is applicable to equipment
requirements. The Theater Army Medical Management Information
System (TAMMIS), being considered for Marine Corps use, has
subsystems for blood management and medical supplies. The World
Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) has similar
subsystems, while the Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System contains a module to control medical supplies and
equipment. All of these systems would function from a control
point located outside of the theater of operations. [Ref. 3]
The intended advantages of such a centralized control point
would be to consolidate resupply transportation planning, to
take advantage of large mainframe computers for formulating
estimates, and to achieve economies of scale [Refs 4 & 5].
However, removing planning from the tactical level could have
adverse effects upon the individual unit [Ref. 6]. For example,
the WWMCCS subsystems contain 309 diagnostic groups which are
paired with the intensity of conflict to estimate medical
supply requirements for an entire theater. Conflict intensities
and diagnoses are bound to differ widely over an entire
theater. It is highly unlikely that such composite estimates
could fully satisfy requirements of diverse units involved with
varied tactical situations in different sectors of a theater.
These inaccuracies could be reduced if locally prepared
estimates could be made more accurate, and then consolidated at
the centralized point of control into a theater wide estimate.
B. THESIS OBJECTIVE
The objectives of this thesis are to develop an improved
medical logistics estimation technique which uses local
information to identify agents causing casualties, and
conditions affecting resupply requirements and to incorporate
the technique into an artificial intelligence computer system
prototype. This system is designed to operate on microcomputers
organic to the MSOCs fRef. 7]. The resultant prototype system
will be compared with current manual estimation techniques to
demonstrate the increased accuracy and usability of an
artificial intelligence approach.
C. THESIS SCOPE
To reduce the complex realm of tactical medical logistics
into a domain suitable for prototyping, only the area of blood
resupply estimation will be addressed. This area is documented
and contains many similarities with other areas of medical
planning.
Prototyping methodology will be used to develop a working
model of an expert support system for blood resupply. As with
all prototypes, the system will contain elements which could be
improved by further research. In particular, the prototype
system is not intended for immediate use in forecasting blood
requirements due to data constraints. Rather, its immediate
purpose is to demonstrate the applicability of state of the art
artificial intelligence methodologies to the problem of blood
forecasting in a combat environment.
D. PREVIEW OF SUBSEQUENT CHAPTERS
Chapter II of this thesis will present an overview of the
three most prevalent types of artificial intelligence systems.
Decision support systems, expert systems, and expert support
systems will be addressed. Emphasis will be placed upon
demonstrating the evolution of expert support systems.
Chapter III will portray the current state of the art in
blood requirements forecasting for Marine Corps combat units.
Chapter IV will discuss the selection of data used to create
the prototype forecasting system. The chapter also addresses
activities which were used to construct the system, and how it
was tested against current manual techniques. Chapter V
presents the results of the comparison. Chapter VI presents a
summary of the thesis, discusses conclusions derived from the
thesis research, and provides recommendations for future
research in the area.
II . ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence may be considered as the process of
embodying computers with the capabilities to either make
decisions independently or to assist human decision makers
[Ref. 8: p. 2]. Although relatively brief in its history, the
Artificial Intelligence field to date as applied to decision
making may be divided into two main types of systems: decision
support systems and expert systems [Ref. 9: p. 21]. Of these
two categories, the decision support system is decidedly the
older concept.
B. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
In the 1970 's the concept of decision support systems was
conceived as a means of assisting human decision makers [Ref.
10: p. 36]. The method developed to allow such assistance was
the decision support system generator, which operates by
employing a mathematical model to perform computations,
comparisons of alternatives, or projections. This model derives
its required data from a database which may either be contained
within the computer, or solicited from the system user [Ref.
11: p. 9]
.
If we consider the mathematical model and the database to
be the first two elements of a decision support system, then we
can identify the third required element as a conversational
interactive interface for the user [Ref. 12: p. 21]. Since the
ultimate intended user of a decision support system is not a
computer expert but rather a line manager, the system must
include an interface mechanism whereby the non-expert user can
query and interact with the system, and derive answers to his
queries. Graphically, the required elements of a decision
support system are demonstrated in Figure 2.1. These elements
may be considered as applicable to all decision support systems












(Source: Ref. 9: p. 22)
Figure 2.1 Elements of Decision Support Systems
The intent of decision support systems was to improve
management decision making in two ways: by assisting in problem
solving, and by facilitating communication within the user's
organization. Problem solving would be aided by deriving
6
solutions from the decision support system, while
communications would be enhanced by the need to gather data
from throughout the organization for the database subsystem, as
well as by readily having data available to respond to queries
from within the organization in a timely manner [Ref. 14: p.
184] . These types of queries, which may be termed ad hoc or
non-routine, were seen as a major benefit of decision support
systems since such queries were ascertained to be the most time
consuming for managers within organizations [Ref. 15: p. 121].
In addition to reducing the time required to respond to ad
hoc queries, decision support systems were also intended to
increase the precision of management decisions for which they
were utilized by relying on statistical models rather than
subjective reasoning, which sometimes failed to consider all
factors affecting a situation [Ref. 8: p. 2]. However, for the
system to be successful in accurately assisting management
decision making, specifications for the system must be exact.
Indeed, some researchers consider system requirements
specification to be the most crucial step in developing a
decision support system [Ref. 10: p. 37].
While classic systems analysis acts to define system
requirements by specifying implementation and hardware
specifications coupled with alternative logical approaches to
achieving system goals, decision support systems require
exceptional effort in the requirements specification [Ref. 16:
p. 15]. In addition to the classic steps, efforts must also be
made to delineate which of the organization's decision making
activities can actually be helped by using a decision support
system, to identify what data is available to the proposed
system, to identify what training is required for prospective
users, and to identify what organizational and interpersonal
impediments exist to the proposed system (i.e., will managers
willingly relinquish some decision making authority to a
machine) . Failure to clearly specify these requirements is
noted as the principal cause of decision support system
failure, even if all other functional aspects are satisfactory
[Ref 15: p. 130]
.
If properly designed and implemented, decision support
systems have been found to be highly useful in a diverse range
of organizational enterprises. Although their employment covers
a broad spectrum, the greatest benefit of such systems seems to
be in either unstructured or loosely structured decision making
environments [Refs. 17: p. 2 & 9: p. 21]. By combining the use
of analytical modelling techniques with traditional data access
and retrieval, a decision support system succeeds in imposing a
logical structure upon the problem environment. This aspect
makes such systems particularly attractive to applications
where decisions are required under some level of uncertainty,
or where the decision making parameters are not clearly defined
[Ref. 18: p. 397]
.
Numerous decision support systems in such environments have
been developed. For example, a system known as Geodata Analysis
8
and Display System (GADS) was developed to assist civilain
police departments in allocating crime fighting assets. GADS
functions by comparing relative crime rates and indices in
different geopgraphic conditions, and indicating where police
assets could be most advatageously utilized. Another example
would be the Portfolio Management System (PMS) which is used by
financial investment managers to determine where clients'
monies could be invested for a maximum return on investment
with varying levels of risk. [Ref. 9: p. 25]
Other decision support systems have been developed for
specific problem environments or applications. O'Keefe and
Wade, for example, developed a decision support system using
microcomputer assets which aided managerial decision making in
areas such as production and inventory control, and personnel
management in a remote sawmill operation [Ref. 19: p. 289].
Naylor in 1975 developed a system for use by executives engaged
in corporate planning activities called SIMPLAN [Ref. 11: p.
15]. Ztrux, a major truck manufacturer, developed a decision
support system called The Capacity Information System (CIS) for
use in production planning [Ref. 11: p. 20]. All of these
examples noted were found to be effective in aiding individual
decision makers in problem solving activities in environments
with little or no structure.
Current research in decision support systems has moved
beyond the concept of a single decision maker, and concentrates
on the efforts and interactive effects of several decision
9
makers who are all involved in making a single decision. Termed
Group Decision Support Systems, these systems seek to allow
more than one problem solver at a time to work on a problem
[Ref . 20: p. 9]
.
So far, the greatest limitation upon this new technology
has been the requisite communications requirements. However, on
going research promises to overcome such constraints by
utilizing four types of modules in computer-based systems: a
Group Norm Monitor, a Group Norm Filter, an Invocation
Mechanism, and an individual decision support system to group
decision support system Document Formatter. [Ref. 20 :p. 9]
Thus, decision support systems are statistical model-based
systems which work with decision makers through an interactive
interface to aid problem solving activities, and are most
applicable to environments where there is little or no
structure; the lack of structure precluding a direct decision
making approach [Ref. 21: p. 42]. By these criteria, there
would appear to be numerous applications potential in the





As the field of artificial intelligence matured, new
techniques were sought which would provide greater flexibility
to the computer decision making process. A departure from rigid
statistical algorithmic approaches to problem solving was
sought which would more closely mimic the cognitive processes
of human beings. In pursuit of this goal, a shift in the
research was noted in the early 1980s toward rule-based systems
in the logic of artificial intelligence systems [Ref. 22: p.
98]. These efforts culminated in a new design technology which
was termed expert systems, and was viewed as a progression
beyond decision support systems within artificial intelligence
[Refs. 23: p. 7 & 24: p. 315].
An expert system may be defined as a computer program which
contains both declaritive knowledge (e.g., facts about objects,
events, or situations) and procedural knowledge (e.g., facts
about different courses of action), which is used in a rule-
based methodology to emulate the reasoning processes of a human
expert in a specified domain [Ref. 25: p. 104]. The rule-based
concept implies that decisions or courses of action recommended
by the system are derived from a pseudo-intuitive process
which, usually, utilizes Boolean arguments (i.e., rules) acting
upon an available database to produce the system's output.
Expert systems are notably different from decision support
systems in several ways. Where decision support systems may be
considered as causal in their approach to decision making,
11
expert systems are construed as judgemental based upon some
type of logical process [Ref. 24: p. 312]. Another area of
distinction is the language used to code the programs. Decision
support systems usually use a third generation language such as
BASIC or FORTRAN. Expert systems, on the other hand, usually
employ a fourth generation language such as LISP or PROLOG
which embodies a logical chaining scheme more applicable to a
rule-based methodology [Ref. 9: p. 24]. While mathematical
models in a decision support system make decisions in a rigid
sequence of steps using an algorithm, expert systems use
knowledge derived from human experts in varying sequences
(i.e., chaining schemes) to arrive at solutions in a manner
similar to a human being who acts upon informed hunches [Ref.
26: p. 564]. This high reliance on captured human expertise
(termed a knowledge base) serves to make the greatest problem
in designing an expert system the acquisition of the knowledge
from which the rules are formulated, whereas the specification
of requirements is the greatest problem in decision support
systems [Ref. 26: p. 564] . Further distinctions between the two
types of systems are noted in Table I
.
Expert systems possess several characteristics which make
them unique within the realm of artificial intelligence. For
example, they address only a specific and narrowly defined
domain for their problem solving activities, and possess a
specially stylized language for input and output functions so
that users can track the system's reasoning activities as it
12
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DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DECISION SUPPORT


























[Ref. 27: p. 123
deals with a problem [Ref. 28: p. 273]. The systems also allow
for incremental knowledge growth by the addition of individual
if-then type rules, which is usually accomplished by a
specialized knowledge engineer [Ref. 9: p. 200]. Indeed, a
principal strength of expert systems is their ability to adapt
to changing conditions or acquisition of new knowledge within
their domains by way of the knowledge engineer's activities.
However, expert systems do possess some weaknesses. For
example, systems which possess less than ten or more than ten
thousand rules do not seem to be as successful as systems which
possess a number within these boundaries [Ref. 23: p. 12]. This
phenomenon may be attributed to a recommended design criteria
that expert systems only be built for problems which would
normally take a human expert between a few minutes to a few
13
hours to solve [Ref. 29: p. 82]. Problems which fall beyond
this range of complexity appear to entail too great an effort
in requisite expert knowledge extraction for the development of
a system to be worthwhile. Further, systems which must deal
with domains which are too complex are, themselves, often too
complex for use by non-expert users. Those which fall below it
are so simple that developing a system would not be
economically feasible.
Further inherent weaknesses of expert systems include their
inability to reason on multiple levels, their inability to view
problem domains from alternative perspectives, and their
failure to know when to vary from their own rules to adapt to a
changing domain [Ref. 9: p. 176]. In addition, expert systems
are not truly applicable to well structured numerical problems,
where the system's chaining logic is not adequately utilized
and actually becomes a burden during the design phase [Ref. 23:
p. 12]. However, despite these shortfalls expert systems have
found notable success in applications in numerous fields. These
will be discussed below.
A generic structure for an expert system may be seen in
Figure 2.2. In th^ figure, note the inference engine where the
logical chaining mechanism previously discussed resides.
Certain elements are required for the effective design of
an expert system. These would include: facts about the domain,
problem situations and potential solutions, and general problem
solving strategies commonly employed by a human expert [Ref.
14
*26: p. 564]. Most of these elements are derived from one or
more human experts, who pass on their knowledge to a system








[Ref. 9: p. 23
Figure 2.2 Expert System Structure
questionnaires or a combination of all three. Information
obtained from the human expert's experience with the domain is
vital for problem-solving with the system [Ref. 30: p. 163].
However, acquired human knowledge is, by its very nature,
subjective and may need to be modified as further experience
with the domain is obtained, or domain parameters are altered
over time and no longer provide a perfect fit to the expert's
subjective experience. One technique effectively used in expert
system design to overcome the subjectivity of expert knowledge
is that of prototyping.
Prototyping entails developing a functional but temporary
system which can adequately function in an actual domain, but
15
which is implemented with the expectation and intent of
modifying the system after observing its effectiveness and
efficiency [Ref. 16: p. 212]. In expert systems this approach
is particularly applicable since there are very few experts who
not only know every piece of information about their problem
domain, but can also relate that information completely so that
it is captured in total within the knowledge base. Further,
even if such a feat is possible, the domain may change or
expand, making modification of the expert system necessary.
This can be a costly and time consuming enterprise. Therefore,
the preferred development scheme for expert systems is
prototyping.
Prototyping for expert systems requires not only
interaction with human experts who provide the knowledge base,
but also explicit interaction with the potential users of the
system [Ref. 26: p. 566]. Normally, these users are found to be
mid-level or operational managers, where the majority of
problem solving occurs within an organization [Ref. 26: p.
565]. High levels of interface with prototype users, even to
the consideration of what types of hardware will be used to
operate the prototype system, frequently result in higher
acceptance and success of expert systems [Refs. 26: p. 565 &
29: p. 841
.
Prototyping applications of expert systems has proven quite
successful in a myriad of domains. Hurley and Wallace
successfully used the technique in the public sector to develop
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functional systems in the fields of personnel administration
and emergency management [Ref. 26: p. 563]. Significantly,
their systems were developed totally on microcomputers of the
same type which the users would employ. INTERNIST, a medical
expert system which can assist physicians in analyzing
approximately 3000 symptoms and diagnosing some 500
diseases, and PROSPECTOR, a geological expert system which aids
field workers in searching for minerals, are other examples of
successful expert systems which were developed using the
prototyping methodology [Ref. 9: p. 25].
Current literature is filled with numerous other successful
expert systems. Of particular interest to the current research
are those involved in the field of medicine, where the
subjective assessment and reasoning skills routinely utilized
by physicians are admirably adaptable to an expert system's
knowledge base. Some highly successful examples would include
the Causal Associational Network (CASNET) system developed at
Rutgers University to assist in medical diagnosis of glaucoma,
IRIS (also from Rutgers University) which uses semantic nets
and production rules to differentially diagnose opthalmic
disease, and HEME (from Cornell University) which uses a
combination of entered patient data and Bayesian theory to
compute the probability that a patient has a disease contained
in the system's database [Refs. 31: p. 177 & 25: p. 124].
Perhaps the premier expert system application in medicine
has been that of MYCIN, which is a rule-based system employing
17
a backward chaining scheme which was developed at Stanford
University to assist clinicians in selecting appropriate
antimicrobial therapy for hopitalized patients with diagnoses
of bacteremia, cystitis, and meningitis [Ref. 25: p. 126].
Aside from its wide- spread acceptance by the medical community
and its consideration as a benchmark for subsequent medical
expert systems, MYCIN is noteworthy for its having been
externally validated by being formally tested for its
effectiveness relative to human experts. In 1979 a blind
evaluation of MYCIN was conducted under the auspices of the
American Medical Association. Acknowledged and independent
experts evaluated the recommended courses of treatment of MYCIN
and eight groups of clinicians representing skill levels
ranging from medical student to medical school professors. In
all categories, the MYCIN system was found to recommend a more
effective course of therapy more often than any group . Thus,
the MYCIN expert system was found to be superior to operational
experts. [Ref. 28: p. 281]
Expert systems continue to exert a significant impact upon
research in artificial intelligence. One area of current
research is that of causal models which formalize the factors
within the domain of the system which affect the problem
environment [Ref. 281: p. 275]. Methods are being examined to
overcome problems of expert subjectivity noted previously.
One area of current research serves to incorporate both of
these concerns, and is viewed as the next progression in
18
artificial intelligence research. This new methodology
combines elements of both decision support systems and expert
systems into composite systems which have qualities of both,
and which are called expert support systems [Ref. 32: p. 114]
19
C. EXPERT SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Expert support systems may be construed as a form of
intelligent decision support systems, where the system
symbolically understands relationships between activities and
domain conditions [ibid]. Such understanding is derived from
logical deduction processes, which in turn lead to goal
directed behavior within the expert support system [Ref. 33: p.
44] . In this manner, such a system could more closely emulate
human cognitive processes than either decision support systems
or expert systems, since human beings utilize both mathematical
/probabilistic and symbolic/relational reasoning in problem
solving within their minds [Refs. 33: p. 86 & 34: p. 149].
Such human structuring or modeling of the world within
the individual mind may be considered as a process whereby
activities within the real world are reduced to basic cognitive
goal-action relationships or rules. In expert support systems,
such rules may be considered productions since the outcome of
each rule is a product in the form of some type of action. A
system composed of such productions could then be termed a
rule-based production system since the output of the system
would be an action product (i.e., a decision or problem
resolution) of some sort [Ref. 9: p. 201]. The conceptual
application of an expert support system as a production system
is made possible if decisions requiring resolution by the
system user are structured so that analytical tools, in
conjuction with a knowledge base, are embedded in the system
20
and are used to generate possible problem solutions [Ref. 32:
p. 1121.
Combining expert system concepts with those of decision
support systems would allow inclusion of a human expert's
inference capabilities as well as statistical models [Ref. 9:
p. 26]. There are two basic techniques in combining elements of
expert systems and decision support systems. The first
technique entails integrating an entire expert system into
conventional decision support system components. This technique
is considered to be quite complex, and entails exhaustive
interface with human experts and full integration of the
knowledge base with the statistical generator. Emphasis in this
type of combinatorial system is upon the expert system
components
.
The second type of combined system employs an approach of
using an expert system component as an additional feature of a
traditional decision support system. With this technique, an
"add-on" expert component is logically located outside of the
decision support system, and requires only partial integration
with the statistical generator. The schematic structure of this
second combinatorial method is shown in Figure 2.2. In this
combinatorial scheme it is the decision support system which is
dominant. [Ref . 27: p. 121]
This add-on structure can overcome some deficiencies of
pure decision support systems. Decision support systems do not
include both primary and secondary processes. While the
21
statistical generator may fulfill the primary process





[Ref. 27: p. 129]
Figure 2.3 Expert System as a Component of a Decision
Support System
(i.e., secondary process). Using the add on expert system
component is one method to overcome this shortfall, and serves
to remove cognitive limitations normally imposed on decision
support systems [Ref. 35: p. 403]. This concept is illustrated
by Figure 2.3. In addition to providing both primary and
secondary processes the add-on expert system component can also
increase the accuracy of forecasts or decisions over pure
decision support systems [Ref. 27: p. 123].
Since the add-on methodology is notably less complex than
the integrated technique, it is significantly more adaptable to
a prototyping development methodology. Creating a functional
22
prototype of a new expert support system results in several













[Ref. 35: p. 412]
Figure 2.4 Combined Primary and Secondary Processing System
functional design quality over conventional techniques, easier
testing of the design, and a much more thorough understanding
of the application, as well as a more accurate estimate of
required implementation effort [Ref. 36: p. 72]. The eight
steps involved in developing a functional prototype of an
expert support system are: 1) examination of the domain and
logically structuring it into productions, 2) derivation of a
statistical model, 3) interviews of expert(s) to derive
knowledge base, 4) initial implementation, 5) case analysis, 6)
23
refinement of the functional prototype, 7) user acceptance of




Current manual estimation procedures for blood resupply
requirements are not adequate to meet the needs of the force.
Observations conducted during large military exercises (e.g.,
Ocean Venture-82, Solid Shield-83, Ocean Venture-84, Solid
Shield-85) consistently demonstrate that methods in use to
forecast blood requirements to support Marine Corps combat
operations seldom result in an accurate estimate, but instead
almost always result in one of two outcomes. Either too little
blood will be forecast as a resupply requirement (which will
jeopardize the health of wounded and ill casualties), or too
much blood will be estimated as necessary (which will result in
unnecessary strain upon logistics channels and waste of a
perishable and valuable commodity) . To alleviate unnecessary
risk to engaged forces, military planners invariably choose to
knowingly err with caution, and so willingly order more blood
than is objectively justified [Refs. 4 & 37]. This inflation of
blood resupply requirements may be construed as a positive
force survival mechanism based upon its intent. However, if the
practice is coupled with inherently inaccurate forecasting
methodologies, then the result could be grossly inflated blood
resupply requirements which will result in wasted blood.
The current manual blood forecasting techniques rely upon
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reference instructions to provide planning statistics for use
in estimating blood requirements [Ref. 38], These references
utilize historical data for diverse combat theaters, tactical
scheme of maneuver, and intensity of conflict to estimate
casualty rates. These are then converted to blood requirements
based upon observed usage rates in past conflicts. While the
historical basis of estimating has considerable merit, the
principal weakness of the current methodology is the reliance
upon generalized estimates. And the principal cause of this
weakness may be seen to be a structure favoring historical
observation of usage rates rather than causal inference within
the reference estimates.
By avoiding a causal perspective, the current estimating
techniques cannot help but provide the medical planner with a
generalized scenario which is, at best, a loose fit of his
current tactical situation. Further, the planner has no
opportunity to tailor the gross estimate obtained by the
references to his current tactical situation by emphasizing
factors causing blood requirements, while simultaneously
deemphasizing or eliminating factors which are not causal in
his current situation, but which are resident in the gross
planning estimates provided by the ref^-^nces.
It is not the intensity of conflict alone, for example,
which leads to blood requirements. An illustrative hypothetical
situation could be a scenario where the enemy is vigorously
resisting from entrenched positions, but only has incendiary
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weapons available for their use in combat. Based upon
historical data where similar tactical situations existed (but
not similar tactical threat), and where similar casualty
estimates were encountered, a high blood requirement would be
indicated. However, in reality no blood would be required to
care for burn casualties [Ref. 39: p. 7]. Thus, in this
hypothetical situation, the reliance upon generalized non-
causal historical estimates would result in a seriously
inaccurate forecast of actual blood requirements.
The on-site medical planner would no doubt take action
to halt the shipment of unnecessary blood. In a like manner he
would also take steps to increase his blood resupply if the
forecast quantity were notably insufficient. However, the
medical planner would be severely constrained in making an
accurate adjustment based upon causal factors if he were not
provided with causal planning statistics. Presently these are
not available to him. At best, the present day medical planner
can observe usage rates over his unit's recent history and
hypothesize that the recent trend for usage rate will continue.
An alternative approach to locally adjusting generalized
blood requirements estimates would be to identify causal
agents, and observe their influence over time upon actual blood
requirements. These causal agents could be construed to be
cumulatively contributory to actual blood requirements. It is
possible that, having identified such causal agents and having
obtained such observations, forecasts of blood requirements
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could be based solely upon these factors. This process would
effectively shift the blood forecasting process from the
current consumption trend historical technique to an approach
which is causal in nature.
However accurate the locally derived estimate is, though,
it will not benefit the medical planner or the unit which he is
supporting if his input is not eventually incorporated into the
blood requirement estimation process. As discussed previously,
recent trends in medical logisitics have been to remove the
requirements estimation process from the tactical unit, and
place it with a geographically distant and organizationally
superior centralized planning agency who would consolidate all
logistics requirements to achieve economies of scale and to
take advantage of high powered data processing equipment not
available on the battlefield. This process will not solicit
estimation input from the local planners. Instead it will
utilize blood usage rates from all units within a theater to
estimate a composite blood requirement. Input from the local
medical planner will be minimal and in a rigid format [Refs.
4 <& 6]. The result could be seen to be a continuation of poor
blood requirements forecasts for local Marine combat forces.
If the accuracy of local blood requirements forecasting
could be improved, then the local estimate may come to be
considered useful input to the centralized planning agency, and
could result in overall increased accuracy of the composite
theater estimate. However, before such an argument may be
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pressed, the efficacy of local causal forecasting must be
demonstrated. One method of increasing the accuracy of the
local estimates may be to automate the forecasting process
using microcomputer assets. However, such an automated system
must be accepted by the medical planner if it is to be
successful
.
Health care professionals possess unique character traits
which have historically made their acceptance of fully
automated decision making aids difficult to achieve [Ref. 40:
p. 267]. Conversely, decision making systems which either
function in conjunction with human experts or embody human
expertise in an advisory or consultative mode have achieved
notable success in medical environments (i.e., MYCIN,
INTERNIST). Thus, it could be surmised that if an automated
system is to be accepted in the medical planning environment it
must incorporate human expertise, and that this human expertise
should be evident to the system user. One method of achieving
this goal would be to utilize an expert support system for
blood requirements estimation.
Finally, for the system to be utilized, it must also be
designed for use on the type of microcomputer hardware
available to the Marine unit medical planner. Further, required
training to use the system would need to be minimal. If
training were too time consuming, then medical planners would
be reluctant to remove their personnel from direct medical
support tasks to let them acquire necessary expertise [Ref. 4].
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In summary, increased accuracy in blood requirements
forecasting may be possible using a causal approach rather than
the observed trend methodology currently in use. Further, if
such an approach were significantly more accurate, then the
forecasting function could be justified as needing to be
retained at the local tactical level. The system must include
some semblance of human expertise to be accepted by medical
professionals. And also, it must be able to be utilized with
current microcomputer assets available to the local medical
planner, and require minimal training time for user personnel
to become proficient in using the system.
An expert support system was deemed to be applicable to
these unique domain characteristics. While the process is
predominantly inclined toward statistical processing, there are
also notable subjective intuitive actions (secondary
processing) which are usually accomplished as addendum
processes to the statistical procedures. Thus, the domain
appears to support the concept of an add-on type of expert
support system.
The current research was undertaken to both demonstrate an
improved blood forecasting methodology based on causal
influences, and to automate this new methodology into an expert
support system.
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IV. FORECASTING MODEL AND SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
A. DATA SELECTION
In order to develop an expert support system which would be
applicable to the United States Marine Corps (USMC)
environment, data was required which historically depicted
actual human blood requirements for USMC units who have
operated in active combat conditions. Further, this historical
data would need to be organized in such a way that causal and
influential factors affecting blood consumption could be
directly observed or indirectly inferred. Ideally, this data
would be available for multiple engagements in diverse
environments and under varied tactical conditions.
Although historical data for the incidence of combat
casualties was available, many of the databases could not be
used for identifying USMC casualties [Ref. 41: p. 4]. Further,
much of the data reviewed was derived from combat engagements
many decades prior to the current research. While this data,
some from the American Civil War, was of historical interest it
was not felt to be contributory toward an expert support system
which would reflect modern warfare scenarios. Even data from
World War I and World War II was considered to be of little
value since weaponry and tactics have changed so much over
recent decades. The distribution and types of casualties from
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more recent conflicts are markedly different than casualties
from all previous wars [Ref. 42: p. 3]. For example, blood
requirements for combat against non-explosive artillery or low
velocity projectiles (such as musket balls), are not likely to
be encountered in modern warfare.
A decision was simultaneously made not to attempt to
incorporate data for nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC)
casualties into the expert support system. There were several
reasons for this decision. First, although estimates of NBC
casualties resulting in modern tactical warfare have been
compiled, no actual statistics are available [Refs. 43: p. 3 &
44: p. 63]. Developing an estimating tool which is itself based
upon estimates would be difficult to evaluate. Secondly, it
would be difficult to identify specifically which NBC weapons
USMC elements would encounter. This is particularly true of
biological weapons [Ref. 45]. Finally, blood requirements for
any NBC environment have not keen defined. Aside from blood
needed to treat as yet unspecified casualties, the NBC
environment would compound blood requirements contributory
factors (e. g. , transportation of blood resupply, power
requirements for refrigerated storage) to an unknown degree
[Ref. 46]. In view of tb^se considerations, no attempt was made
to include NBC weaponry as causal agents in the expert support
system.
Since the Vietnam conflict was the most recent large
warfare environment in which the Marine Corps was involved
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where notable casualties were incurred, and since the weaponry
employed throughout the conflict was construed to reflect
modern armaments likely to be encountered by the Marine Corps
in any combat operations in the near future, the search for
data focused on that conflict. Casualty data from Vietnam was
found to be readily available [Refs. 47: p. 9, 48: p. 128 ,49:
p. 150, 50: p. 6, 41: p. 4, & 39: p. 3]. However, in much of
this data separation of USMC casualties and identification of
wound causal agents was difficult or impossible. Fortunately,
one database was discovered which satisfied both of these
constraints [Ref. 39: p. 11].
During the period January through June of 1968, a study was
undertaken at the Naval Support Activity Hospital, Danang,
Republic of South Vietnam to construct a surgical database.
Medical data for 2021 male combat casualties, primarily United
States Marines and Army soldiers, was collected. During this
period there were 2008 casualties admitted to the facility, 13
of which were admitted twice during the six-month study period.
For each casualty admitted to the facility, 63 data elements,
displayed in Table II, were obtained and entered into a
surgical database [Ref. 51]. This database was subsequently
updated for each casualty as treatment continued.
Of particular interest to the current research was the data
specifically compiled for CAUSE OF WOUND, BRANCH OF SERVICE,
and NUMBER OF UNITS OF BLOOD GIVEN. This data was subsequently
refined and published by the Naval Medical Research and
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Development Command as a study depicting blood utilization at
the Danang facility during the six-month period indicated [Ref.
39]. The resulting statistics (Table III) were used in the
development of an expert support system to be described later
in this chapter.
It is significant to note that during the period 1964 to
1972, 15,113 (19.2 %) of the 78,726 Marine combat Wounded in
Action (WIA) casualties in Vietnam were treated at the Naval
Support Activity Hospital, Danang, even though they received
their wounds in diverse regions of that country [Ref. 41: p.
10] . This suggests a large representative sample of all USMC
WIA casualties incurred there. Further, the wound causal agents
for the Danang facility WIA admissions were representative of
and in reasonably close proportion to the wounding agents for
all Marine casualties admitted to all medical treatment
facilites during the Vietnam conflict (Table IV). Thus, the
Danang statistics were construed to be a representative sample
of all United States Marine Corps WIA casualties suffered
during the Vietnam conflict.
B . METHODOLOGY
In order to develop an expert support system, one of the
first tasks required is to examine the structure of the
decision environment and ascertain that it is adaptable to both
decision support systems and expert systems [Ref. 52: p. 207].
As previously noted, decision support systems are most
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applicable to environments where factors which affect the
variable of interest can be identified, isolated, and
quantified. Such factors are then incorporated into a decision
support system using either probabilistic or Boolean
techniques, or a combination of both [Ref. 53: 42]. Further,
the level and type of decision-making must also be considered
in determining whether or not a decison support system will be
applicable
.
There are three types of decisions in management contexts:
Operational Control (decisions assuring effectiveness of
operations), Management Control (decisions for acquisition and
control of resources), and Strategic Planning (decisions
related to setting policies) [Ref. 54: p. 9761. Each of these
categories apply to a full spectrum of degrees of structure in
specific decision-making environments. Decision support systems
have been somewhat effective in semi -structured environments,
and not effective at all in unstructured environments. Their
greatest effectiveness is in their application to structured
decision-making [Ref. 52: p. 217].
In this context, an analysis of the current procedures for
blood requirements estimation and ordering used by Navy medical
personnel in support of Marine Corps elements was undertaken,
and an attempt made to identify decision elements applicable to
a decision support system.
A review of available data indicated that the decision-
making process of estimating blood resupply requirements was
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quite structured, and seemed to fall within the decision
categories of Operational Control (since it determined the
effectiveness of the blood program operations) and Management
Control (since it dealt with acquisition and control of blood
resources). Thus, the blood resupply requirements decision
seemed initially applicable to decision support system
techniques
.
It was clearly evident that all Marines received their
wounds from a foreign object (e.g., a causal agent). In
addition, throughout the Vietnam conflict wounds were
consistently caused by the same agents [Ref . 41: p. 9] . Data
for wounds caused by these agents was readily available in the
aforementioned Danang database, including the percentage of
total wounds caused by each agent, and the mean number of units
of blood required for wounds from each agent.
As previously noted, current blood requirements estimation
relies upon two primary variables: number of casualties
anticipated, and blood storage capability available. While
these decision criteria are widely employed, refinement is
possible which could increase accuracy appreciably. Though it
is convenient in manual estimation procedures to group all
wounds together into a gross composite statistic, resultant
estimation accuracy suffers. If data is available which clearly
depicts how much blood is required for wounds caused by
individual types of agents, and if the data further portrays
what proportion of all wounds will be caused by each agent
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present, then a much more accurate requirements forecast should
be derived using the agent-specific data.
To effectively utilize the available causal agent-specific
data, the total casualties anticipated must be known. This
variable, usually expressed as a percentage of the entire force
and computed by the resident Marine G-l Section (Administration
and Personnel) is readily available to medical personnel upon
request. However, this variable sums casualties in three
categories: killed in action (KIA) , wounded in action (WIA),
and disease non-battle injury (DNBI) Of these categories, only
those of WIA and DNBI will possibly require blood. The three
categories must be separated to effectively utilize the agent-
specific data.
At different periods of an amphibious operation, different
percentages of total casualties will fall into the KIA, WIA,
and DNBI categories. During an unopposed afloat transit to the
combat zone, for example, all casualties would be DNBI. During
an opposed landing/insertion phase, the highest levels of KIA
and WIA would be expected. Further, during the land operations
phase, the WIA and KIA proportions of total casualties will
decrease from the landing/insertion phase, while DNBI
casualties will probably increase.
Based on historical data, estimates of KIA, WIA, and DNBI
casualties as percentages of total casualties at each of the
three stages of Marine combat operations are available [Ref.
21. Use of this data would enable the causal agent-specific
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data to be specifically applied to each discrete phase of
Marine Corps combat operations, thus enhancing the accuracy of
a decision support system employing such data even further over
the current manual technique of blood requirements forecasting.
Thus, to summarize briefly, knowing the size of the force
employed in combat operations, the phase of the combat
operations, the current casualty estimate, and the specific
wound causal agents employed by opposing forces, it should be
possible to develop a decision support system for use in
estimating Marine casualty blood requirements.
C. DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM COMPONENT
Since such a decision support system would be based upon
statistical data rather than Boolean imperatives (i.e., is/is
not situations), an effort was made to develop a model which
would produce a blood requirement statistic.
In creating a forecasting model, a sequence of steps are
generally required. After defining the parameters which affect
changes in demand, the data sources are analyzed, alternative
quantitative projection techniques are assessed, and model
performance criteria are established [Ref. 55: p. i]. Since the
parameters of interest have already been identified, we proceed
to analyzing the data sources.
The Danang database only provided one data point to be used
in forecasting. This placed severe limitations upon the types
of forecasting models which could be constructed for the
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prototype. After a thorough review of available literature, a
naive horizontal model was settled upon [Ref. 56: p. 51].
The naive model considers future demand estimates to be the
same as the most current demand entry. For the current
research, its principal strength was that it required only one
historical observation period: the most current demand. A
statistical depiction of the model would be
X(T) = X T = 1,2,3, . . .
where
X = Forecasted Demand
and X = Most Recent Demand
and T = Future Demand Periods
Being Forecasted
Since the intent of the current research was to derive a
forecasting model for the next period only, the value of T
would be permanently fixed at T = 1 . Thus, the model used in
the current research would be
X(l) = X or X = X
Notable weaknesses were recognized in the use of such a
model. The greatest weakness was that the forecast error would
increase as the value of T increased. However this weakness
could only be overcome by using a more refined forecasting
approach which would require multiple data points (e.g., a
moving average technique). As noted, only a single data point
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was available for the current research. Therefore, due to the
constraints of the available data, and the intent to develop a
prototype system which could be modified in future use when
more demand observations are available, the naive model was
adopted.
Within the Danang data, it appeared evident that the type
of wounding agent exerted an influence on the individual
casualty's demand for blood. Further, the previously noted
parameters (e.g.: phase of operation, casualty estimate, and
force size) were also considered to be contributory in a like
manner. Each wound causal agent was held to act upon the WIA
casualties, as derived from the same previously noted
parameters, in a cumulative manner. Hence, the data seemed to
support an additive causal effect approach to constructing a
forecasting model.
Having defined the relevant parameters, analyzed the data
sources, and assessed alternative quantitative projection
techniques, the next step to be completed in developing a
forecasting model was to establish required performance
criteria. As previously noted, the current manual state of
blood requirements forecasting in the Marine combat environment
is notably less than perfect. The model resulting from the
current research should at least produce a demand estimate
which is closer to the actual demand than the current, manual
techniques. This performance criteria, in fact, served to
generate the experimental hypothesis which was tested.
45
The author next attempted to identify all contributory
variables of blood demand and incorporate them into an
appropriate model. It is known that the percentage of the total
casualties of the entire force which would be wounded, killed,
or ill will vary as a result of the phase of the conflict [Ref.
2]. This phenomenon is presented in Table V. Since blood is
required only for WIA and DNBI casualties, this breakdown is
essential for accurate forecasting. For any given phase of a
TABLE V
PHASE/CASUALTY ESTIMATE
Phase KIA Percent WIA Perc ent DNBI Percent
1 0.00 0.00 100.00
2 21.02 74.08 4.90
3 20.00 57.78 22.22
conflict, the numbers of WIA and DNBI casualties can be
calculated by multiplying the force size by the casualty
estimate. This product can then be multiplied by the WIA or
DNBI percentage to derive the expected casualties in each
category.
An assumption was made by the author that the possibility
of being wounded by a given weapon was an event independent of
being wounded by any other weapon. Being wounded by a bullet,
for example, does not predispose a Marine to also being wounded
by a mortar. He may indeed be subsequently wounded by a mortar,
but the event would not be a direct result of his having been
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wounded by a bullet. The possibility of a second wound
resulting from being immobilized by a first wound or by being
in the act of medical evacuation when the second wound occurred
was considered. However, this was determined to be extremely
unlikely because of the small number of Danang casualties who
received wounds from multiple agents (4.01%). The possibility
of being wounded by each causal agent was therefore assumed to
be independent of the possibility of being wounded by any
other. The data for multiple agent caused wounds was retained,
however, since the amount of blood needed would be different
for casualties with wounds caused by several independent
agents. Since the user could not be expected to provide
contributory input data, values for these agents were computed
and included in the final estimate without the user's awareness
(Table VI)
.
Allowing W to represent the total number of WIA casualties,
determined by multiplying the casualty estimate by the WIA
Percent from Table V for the appropriate phase, and allowing A
to represent the probability of the casualties caused
i
by any given agent i requiring blood, and by letting C
i
represent the expected number of units of blood required
for each WIA casualty caused by any given agent i, we can write
the equation for the expected number of units of blood needed
for WIA casualties for agent i, R , as
i
R = W x A x C
i i i
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The expected total number of units E of blood required for all
WIAs caused by all wounding agents 1 through n is then
determined using the equation
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It must be remembered that not all casualties requiring
blood are WIA. Depending on the phase of the conflict a certain
proportion of the total casualties will be DNBI . Based upon
historical data it is known that each DNBI casualty will
require an average of 0.5 units of blood [Ref . 2] . Thus, if T
represents total casualties, and D represents the percent of
total casualties which are DNBI, then we can write the equation
for the number of units of blood required for all DNBI
casualties, U, as
U = (T x D) x (0.5)
If the equation for WIA blood requirements for wounds
caused by all agents 1 through n and the equation for DNBI
requirements are summed, then the equation for the composite
blood requirement, C, could be written as
C = E + U .
This composite blood requirement could be utilized as the
forecast of blood requirements for a given combat phase. It was
included in this thesis as the decision support system
component of the expert support system. It should be mentioned
that the decision support system model has cprtair categories
of wound causal agents either combined or not included.
Since no WIAs resulting from burning agents required blood,
this agent was eliminated from the model. Also, to simplify
computations and to minimize queries requiring user responses,
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the agents Booby-Trap (Large Fragment) and Booby-Trap (Small
Fragment) were combined into an agent called Booby Trap. The
agents Grenade/Mine/Booby-Trap/Other, Multiple Agents, and
Unknown were combined into a single agent which was computed
transparently to the user.
D. EXPERT SYSTEM COMPONENT
Having developed the decision support system component,
efforts now were turned to developing the expert system
component. As noted previously, for an expert system to be
effective it must capture the experience and expertise of an
expert, and present this captured knowledge in such a way that
it is readily available to the user. The critical element in
accomplishing these goals is the identification of an expert or
experts with the requisite knowledge and experience. Although
there are blood forecasting experts who derived their skills
soley from some form of training, there presently appears to be
a dearth of experts who possess both training and actual combat
blood forecasting experience.
Although some recent combat evolutions have involved the
Marine Corps (e.g., Grenada; Beirut, Lebanon), the encounters
were extremely brief and were considered to have been atypical
of historically normative combat operations [Refs. 57, 58, &
59]. Therefore, an expert was sought who had been directly
involved in medical support of combat operations during the
most recent lengthy and complete Marine combat evolution in
Vietnam.
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Headquarters, United States Marine Corps and operational
medical commands were contacted to assist in identifying
eligible Navy Medical Service Corps officers who might qualify
as subject matter experts [Ref. 7 & 60]. A suitable expert was
identified and contacted, and agreed to participate in the
current research.
Previous research had shown that the most difficult aspect
of knowledge acquisition for use in an expert system was
getting the expert to define the initial knowledge domain [Ref.
28: p. 273]. This resulted from the expert's difficulty in
restructuring his knowledge to the decision-making environment
at hand. This difficulty could be overcome if the domain was
structured for the expert prior to an attempt to acquire
knowledge. In the current research, this domain definition was
accomplished by utilizing locally available blood forecasting
expertise from experts who possessed training but no actual
combat experience. These experts were asked to identify factors
likely to be present in a combat environment which might
influence the demand for blood [Refs. 61 & 62]. Eight factors
were identified which might influence them to alter a blood
forecast statistic (Table VII). These influencing factors were
then organized into a questionaire (Appendix A) and presented
to the subject matter expert. In this manner, difficulties
with the expert defining the data domain were minimized.
The expert was asked to assume that he had been provided
with a blood resupply quantity from an external source (i.e., a
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TABLE VII
BLOOD DEMAND INFLUENCING FACTORS
1. Meteorological Conditions
2. Type of Blood Resupply Transportation
Available
3. Presence or Absence of Tactical Air
Supremacy
4. Reliability of Blood Resupply
Transportation
5. Evacuation Policy
G. Casualty Evacuation Waiting Time
7. Bed Capacity of Supported Force's
Medical Units
8. Major Surgical Capability (Cases per
Day) of Supported Force's Medical Units
medical logistician) . He was to review each influencing factor
shown in Appendix A and to respond based upon his training and
experience as to what effect, if any, the factor would most
likely have upon the provided estimate. He was asked to
indicate by what percent he would increase or decrease the
estimate, and to explain why he felt such a change was
appropriate. Further, he was asked to identify any other
factors which he felt could influence blood demand, and to
assign percentage increase or decrease levels in a like manner.
The expert's responses are displayed in Appendix B. Based
upon the knowledge acquired from the subject matter expert, six
factors were included in the expert support system: 1) blood
resupply transport available, 2) reliability of blood resupply
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transport, 3) evacuation policy, 4) dependability of blood
storage facilities, 5) reliability of blood refrigeration
equipment, and 6) air supremacy. It was interesting to note
that based upon combat experience, the expert eliminated 50% of
the factors supposed to have influence which had been
identified by the experts without combat experience, and
identified two factors which they had not considered dealing
with the reliability of electrical power for blood
refrigerators, and the type of structure which the blood would
be stored in. A conjecture was made that the areas not
indicated by the inexperienced experts were areas which had not
been included in field training problems. Subsequent interviews
revealed this to be the case. Blood storage facilities were
never actually established during field training, so the
experts without combat experience had no inclination that
supply- threatening problems could arise in their operation
[Ref. 63].
Using the subject matter expert's responses as inputs to
the decision support system component, a modified model was
developed which combined the decision support system and expert
system components:
C + J(C) + K(C) + L(C) + M(C) + P(C) + Q(C) = Blood
Requirement.
In this model, the composite blood requirement derived from
the decision support system component is represented as C. The
effect of transport type is represented by the function J(C),
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the effect of transportation reliability by the function K(C),
the effect of evacuation policy by the function L(C), the
effect of storage dependability by the function M(C), the
effect of power supply by the function P(C), and the effect of
air supremacy by the function Q(C). Each function is defined by
multiplying the decision support system component by the
respective expert system component factor, which was determined
by the human expert.
Finally, it was recognized by all experts that any quantity
of blood ordered as a resupply must be considered in light of
two additional factors: the quantity of blood on-hand when the
resupply order is received, and the total blood storage
residual capacity. If the net storage capacity was equal to or
greater than the blood requirement, then the requirement would
be unchanged. If the available storage capacity was less than
the requirement, the requirement was reduced to the storage
capacity.
E. EXPERT SUPPORT SYSTEM
This protocol was joined to the decision support system and
expert system components, and coded into a prototype computer
system entitled PEMOS (Hematologic Expert Support System for
Marine Corps Operational Support), which is displayed in
Appendix C.
In coding the HEMOS prototype a suitable language needed
to be selected. Numerous fourth generation computer languages
had been used for decision support and expert systems by
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previous researchers. One, the Ml language created by
TEKNOWLEDGE Inc., of Palo Alto, California, was attractive for
its backward chaining algorithm. Further, the easily
manipulated rule-based syntax indicated that Ml was notably
appropriate for the loosely structured environment which the
current research entailed. Also, Mi's feature of automatic run
tracing was quite attractive and indicated a minimal amount of
time would be required for debugging and logic modification
activities. In practice, the Ml fourth generation language
appeared to satisfy all special needs of this problem.
F. PROTOTYPE TESTING
To test the experimental hypothesis (i.e., that the HEMOS
system prototype would be more accurate than current manual
techniques), the Danang database was randomly separated into
three segments by a DEC minicomputer using the DATE data field
with an SPSS-X utility randomization function [Ref. 51]. These
segments are displayed in Appendix D. The HEMOS decision
support system component was constructed using only segment C,
which was randomly selected from the three segments. Segments A
and B were reserved for use in hypothesis testing.
A null hypothesis was formulated that there would be no
discernible difference in accuracy between the prototype expert
support system and existing manual techniques in forecasting
blood resupply requirements. To test this hypothesis, an
experiment was conducted using a trained team of Navy Medical
Service Corps officers who were experts by virtue of training,
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but who did not possess actual combat experience. The team was
provided with a set of situational parameters derived from
segment A of the Danang database. These are displayed in Figure
4.1. The parameters matched actual tactical and environmental
conditions which were present when the Danang data were
collected [Refs. 2, 58, & 59]. The parameters for Blood
Remaining On-Hand and Blood Storage Capacity were artificially
set to levels which would minimize the possibility that
required blood exceeded available storage. This was done to
facilitate experimental measurements, and was not considered
disruptive of the forecasting process.
Team members were asked to estimate the blood resupply
requirement using the same methods that they would employ in a
tactical scenario. The computation time needed to formulate
their forecast and the value of the forecast were recorded.
An identical test was conducted using HEMOS operating
on a microcomputer system identical to the manufacturer and
model possessed by all Marine Medical Support Operations Center
units. These units would be anticipated to take these systems
with them into a real world combat scenario. The results from
the two tests are discussed in the next chapter.
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The HEMOS test was conducted using Zenith 258 microcomputer
hardware identical to that possessed by the Marine Corps
Medical Support Operations Centers. To insure against operator
bias, which could have slanted test results in favor of the
prototype from familiarity with automated forecasting systems,
a subject with no previous experience with HEMOS or any other
expert system or decision support system was solicited. A
suitable subject was randomly selected from an Army medical
battalion assisting in the current research.
The selected subject was a female junior enlisted admini-
stration clerk with less than two weeks experience using any
computer equipment. The subject had no previous experience or
training in blood requirements forecasting. Training of the
subject consisted of a seven-minute verbal overview of HEMOS,
followed by one test run using randomly selected data with the
subject operating the system. Total subject training time with
the HEMOS expert support system was twelve minutes.
During the HEMOS test the subject operated the HEMOS system
while the author acted as the MSOC officer and held the
simulation data where the subject could not see it. The
relative physical positions of subject and author were intended
to approximate actual positions in an operational MSOC as
closely as possible. The author gave no coaching to the subject
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regarding HEMOS operation during the test. When requested by
the subject, the author verbally provided the test parameters,
which the subject then entered into the HEMOS system. This
procedure was repeated until 14 simulations were completed. The
resultant mean blood requirements estimate for the 14 tests was
1050 units (range = 0, since the HEMOS system always gave the
same value). The mean estimate preparation time was 2 minutes
21.6 seconds. The times ranged from 2 minutes 58 seconds down
to 2 minutes 2 seconds. However, since only one subject was
used for the HEMOS test, at least some of this decrease in time
was probably due to a learning process in operating the system.
The manual method test was conducted using 14 trained but
inexperienced male Navy Medical Service Corps officers who were
experts in blood requirements forecasting, and who were
available as subjects for the thesis research. The tests were
conducted in an office environment. The subjects received the
test parameters verbally, and transcribed them into personal
notes. They then were asked to derive their estimation of blood
requirements as quickly as possible using any references which
they would expect to have available to them in an operational
environment. The only constraint placed upon the subjects was
the condition that no automated data processing equipment, with
the exception of personal calculator devices, was to be used.
The resultant mean blood requirements estimate derived was 1704
units. The estimates ranged from 1327 units to 2076 units, with
a mean estimate preparation time of 17 minutes 30 seconds. The
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range of preparation times for the manual test was from 15
minutes to 20 minutes.
The results of both sets of simulations were then compared
to the actual usage rate of 1067 units for segment A of the
Danang database. The manual method test result deviated from
the actual requirement by + 62 . 7 % , while the HEMOS test
result deviated by - 1.6 % .
The HEMOS system is superior to the currently practiced
manual estimation technique in two important areas. First, the
average time required to obtain the manual estimate was more
than 750% longer than the time required for an operator with
minimal training to achieve an estimate using the HEMOS system,
It is important to note that estimates made using both
techniques were based upon identical data. Further, the manual
estimations were computed in a quiet environment without the
distractions inherent to an operational Tactical Logistics
Operations Center (TLOC) where an MSOC officer would normally
perform such tasks.
The second finding was that the HEMOS technique produced a
much more accurate blood requirements estimate than the manual
method. By deviating from the actual quantity by + 62.7 %, the
manual methodology, on average, would have wasted 637 units of
human blood. At the extreme end of the manual estimate range,
this figure could increase to a waste of 1009 units. The HEMOS
system underestimated the actual requirement by 17 units of
blood, which might have had a deleterious effect upon the
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health of a small number of casualties (With an actual mean
blood requirement per WIA casualty of 6.62 units, the
inaccuracy in the HEMOS estimate would be expected to impact
2.57 casualties, or 0.38 % of all WIAs. This level was
construed by the author to be negligible.
The accuracy of the HEMOS estimate suggests that the system
is a successful functional prototype. Even in its preliminary
state, the HEMOS expert support system succeeded in
outperforming the current manual methodology both in the time
required and the accuracy of estimate.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDAT I ONS
The current method used to forecast blood requirements
for Marine Corps units operating in combat environments appears
to be grossly inaccurate, and will quite likely result in
unnecessary wasting of blood resources. The material presented
in the preceding chapters indicates that an alternative method
of blood forecasting which is more accurate can be developed.
The current manual procedure is driven primarily by
available blood storage capacity and usage rate. Since usage
rate is determined by highly variant forces in the combat
environment, the technique is frequently inaccurate. To
compensate for this, the current procedure inflates blood
requirement estimates to minimize the risk of blood not being
available for casualties who need it. The result is frequently
an overstocking of blood, which is highly perishable and often
expires before it can be used. Thus, significant quantities of
blood, which must be shipped to the combat units at great
logistical effort, are inevitably wasted.
An alternative approach would be to recognize which agents
in the combat environment cause blood consumption. Historical
data could then be used to project blood requirements caused by
each agent. Individual agent projections could then be combined
for a cumulative blood estimate. To facilitate acceptance by
human users, hunch- like increases or decreases in the
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cumulative estimate could be made by the users based upon
subjectively assessed conditions of the tactical situation.
Thus, the alternative method would be causal in nature, while
the current technique is inferential.
In the current research a prototype expert support system
using this alternative method was developed and tested. The
prototype was named HEMOS , and was found to be more accurate
and notably faster than current manual techniques in a test
situation.
Significant in the current research is that the HEMOS
system was operated by a frankly non-expert user, and still
succeeded in outperforming a team of experts. This observation
certainly demonstrates the potential manpower and training
savings possible with a refined HEMOS system.
The HEMOS expert support system prototype has a basic
weakness in that it was developed using only one data point. It
should have a better statistical forecasting model. Its
decision support system component generator should be based
upon multiple periods of causal observation. Unfortunately, no
such data was available during the current research effort.
Initial response from operational medical personnel who are
familiar with HEMOS and the prototype study results of the
current research has been favorable. This would seem to
indicate that if the deficiencies discussed above were
satisfactorally rectified, HEMOS could gain operational
acceptance from real world users. However, before such
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acceptance could be gained, other issues not directly related
to an expert support system would also need to be resolved.
There are some reservations among operational medical
personnel toward nuturing a dependence upon electronic decision
making aids. It must be reiterated, however, that HEMOS is not
intended to replace the human decision maker. It is intended,
rather, to assist him in an inexact task environment. Further,
it is doubtful that Marine commanders would place complete
trust in a non-human system which would in effect control a
life-and-death commodity, and which would directly affect the
operational success of their mission. Human expertise
complemented by manual methodologies will almost certainly
remain in the tactical blood forecasting environment, at least
as a reserve technique for use in the event of automated data
processing failure.
However, the benefits in time and accuracy of automating
tactical support planning processes cannot be discounted. In
the area of blood requirements forecasting refinement of the
HEMOS prototype could well serve as the basis for future
research, and could result in a viable forecasting alternative
for use by Navy Medical Department personnel. Even without it,
the simple estimating model in the prototype should yield
substantial improvements in both time and accuracy. It is
recommended that research to refine and implement the HEMOS
system be continued. Further, research is also recommended to
identify how acceptance of automated decision-making systems
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could be enhanced by tactical commanders, and to determine
additional areas in the tactical environment where automated
decision-making aids would be applicable.
In conclusion, it is possible to state that HEMOS, even in
its prototypical form, may be seen to be more accurate and less
time consuming than human experts in certain tactical
conditions, and that the system exhibits promise of becoming a
valuable decision making asset, with needed refinements, in the







Weather conditions may or may not affect blood
requirements. For the following weather conditions, in
your best judgement what percent (if any) would you
increase or decrease the statisitcal blood forecast?







The types of transportation available or not available
for use in carrying resupply blood to supported medical
units may or may not lead you to alter the statistical
blood forecast. For the following types of
transportation, what percent (if any) would you












Air and Water :
Air and Ground :
Water and Ground :






Even if blood resupply transportation is available, its
dependability may vary (ie: whether the blood resupply
shipments arrive at all and on time). How would the
following levels of dependability cause you to
increase, decrease, or leave unchanged the statistical
forecast?






Consider that patients awaiting evacuation out of the
combat zone may require continued blood transfusions.
With this in mind, how would the following Evacuation
Policies cause you, if at all, to modify the
statistical forecast?
E\7ACUAT ION POLICY












Assume that Evacuation Waiting Time refers to the
period of time that casualties designated for
evacuation out of the combat zone spend waiting at the
evacuation site for their transportation to arrive,
load them, and depart (eg: casualties waiting by an
airstrip for MEDEVAC planes to arrive, or casualties
waiting at a beach or port for seaward MEDEVAC). How,
if at all, would the following levels of Evacuation









The cumulative Total Bed Capacity of all medical units
being supported may lead you to alter the statistical
estimate. For the following total bed capacities, what
change (if any) would you make to the statistical
forecast?
TOTAL BED % CHANGE
CAPACITY









The number of Major Surgical Cases which can be
performed by all supported medical units during a 24
hour period may cause you to alter the statistical
forecast. Perhaps the greater the surgical capability,
the more surgeries will be performed; thus a greater
need for blood. Or, conversely, perhaps you believe
that there is no relationship between the two factors.
For the following Major Surgical Capabilities, what
changes if any would you make to the statistical
forecast?
MAJOR SURGICAL % CHANGE
CAPABILITY
to 50 cases per day
51 to 90 cases per iday
91 to 120 cases per day
Mo re than 120 cases per day
Comments ?
QUESTION 8
Are there any other areas excluding those mentioned in
the Project Overview which you believe could lead you
to alter the statistical blood requirements forecast?
If yes, then please list them and show what percentage





RESPONSES TO INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Question 1 : Weather Conditions
While cold weather could conceivably cause a requirement
for "fresh" warm blood, this would not be a supply line
problem. My experience prompts no correlation between weather
and simple blood requirements.
Percent change for all weather conditions =
Question 2; Transportation Types Available
The term "air superiority" as you used it must really be
changed to "air supremacy", which is what you meant. That is
when one side has full control of the air, while superiority
infers only temporary control due to a tactical advantage of










Air Only + 20
Water Only + 20
Ground Only + 20
Air & Water : + 20
Air & Ground : + 20
Water & Ground : + 20




Question 3; Blood Resupply Transportation Dependability
In a combat environment I would consider "moderate" to be
the norm. Also, I would prefer that you use the term
"reliability" rather than "dependability". I would alter the
statistic in the following way:




Question 4: Evacuation Policy
This is hard to quantify. Logically, there would probably
be a progression, as indicated.
EVACUATION POLICY % CHANGE
Less than 1 day
1 Day
2 Days + .20
3 Days + .35
4 Days + .65
5 or more days + . 65
Question 5: Evacuation Waiting Time
I think that this factor would be irrelevant and wouldn't
affect blood usage. Since evacuation out of the Combat Zone is
an Air Force function, the MSOC would see little or no impact.




Question 6; Bed Capacity
Mostly irrelevant. Blood requirements are more likely to be
a function of the complexity of surgery than the number of beds
available to be filled by casualties.
Percent change to the statistical estimate: .
Question 7: Number of Major Surgical Cases
As far as I can imagine, the increase based upon number of
sugeries per day would be strictly a direct relationship with
the nuiieiical increase in casualties. Hence, T would not alter
the statistic based upon this variable.
Percent change to the statistical estimate:
Question 8: Other Possible Influences
Two important considerations which you haven't mentioned
would be storage method and the reliability of electrical
power.
1. Storage method relates mainly to equipment being used
and its suitability to the environment. The issue would be
whether the blood was stored in a hardened facility (i.e.:
a facility with genuine blood refrigerators which are
alarmed with a temperature recorder, and which is hardened
against attack)
.
- if not hardened, increase the statistic by 15 %.
- if .is hardened, do not change statistic.
2. The power supply for blood refrigeration refrigerators
must be assessed for:
- reliability
- circuit switching capability
- an alarmed and monitored circuit
- reserve capacity.
If any one of the above conditions are not met, then





/ * * * * *
HEMOS
*********
(Hematologic Expert Support System for








This system is intended for use by medical
personnel assigned in support of Marine
Corps combat operations, to be used in
computing a recommended quantity of human
blood to be included in a blood resupply
request. The system is unique in that it:
1) Uses both a statistical algorithm
AND an expert knowledge base to obtain
a recommended blood requirements
forecast,
2) Is a thoroughly comprehensive system
relative to all aspects of combat
operations
,
3) Employs statistical estimates of
casualties, obtained from historical
statistics from the Viet Nam conflict,
in a Bayesian algorithm,
4) The resulting recommended statistic
could be employed in an Exponential
Smoothing model after the third day of








/* Rules 1 and 2 compare the blood request with the
available blood storage capacity, and ensure that
the final blood request will not exceed available
storage capacity
*/
rule-1: if fin_blood_req_a = ZZZZ and
blood_room_avail = JJJ and
JJJ >= ZZZZ
then fin_blood_req = ZZZZ.
rule-2 : if fin_blood_req_a = ZZZZ and
blood_room_avail = JJJ and
ZZZZ > JJJ
then fin_blood_req = JJJ.
rule-3: if blood_on_hand = III and
blood_req = ZZZZ and
III >= ZZZZ
then fin_blood_req = 0.
rule-4: if blood_on_hand = III and
blood_req = ZZZZ and
ZZZZ > III
then fin_blood_req_a = ZZZZ.
/* Rules 5 and 6 compute a blood requirement using
percentage weights for individual variables as
determined by a subject matter expert.
* /
rule-5: if comp_blood_req = V and
transdep = CCC and
evac_blood = DDD and
air_blood = GGG and
stor_blood = MMM and
power_effect = NNN and
trans_dep = 1 or
trans_dep = 2 and
V + CCC + GGG + MMM + NNN + DDD = ZZZZ




rule- 6: if comp_blood_req = V and
transdep = CCC and
evac_blood = DDD and
air_blood = GGG and
stor_blood = MMM and
power_effect = NNN and
trans_dep = 3 and
V + GGG + MMM + NNN + DDD - CCC = ZZZZ
then blood_req = ZZZZ.
/* Rule 5 incorporates the Disease Non-Battle Injury
blood requirement into the tentative blood
requirement which was previously computed for the
Wounded in Action casualties.
*/
rule-7: if ten_blood_req = Q and
d_blood_req = U and
Q + U = V
then comp_blood_req = V.
/* Rule 6 computes a statistical blood requirement
based upon conflict stage, population, casualty
estimate, and weapons employed by the enemy.
*/
rule-8: if bull_need = J and
gren_need = K and
arty_need = L and
boob_need = M and
othr_need = N and
mine_need = X and
z_need = P and
J + K + L + M + N + X + P = Q
then ten _blood_req = Q.
/* Rules 7 thru 59 compute a statistical blood forecast
using a strictly algorithmic technique.
*/
rule- 9: if d_cas = S and
d_drip = T and
S * T = U




rule- 10: if d_pcen = R and
num_cas = C and
R * C = S
then d_cas = S.
rule-11: if conflict
then d_drip = . 5
.
rule-12: if bull_blood = WRB and
bull_drip = CC and
WRB * CC = J
then bull_need = J.
rule-13: if bull_type = yes
then bull_drip = 4.7.
rule-14: if bull_cas = WR and
bull_brate = BB and
WR * BB = WRB
then bull_blood = WRB.
rule-15: if bull_type = yes
then bull_brate = .2067
rule-16: if bull_type = yes
then bull_rate = .2222.
rule-17: if w_cas = E and
bull_rate = AA and
E * AA = WR
then bull_cas = WR.
rule- 18: if w_pcen = D and
num_cas = C and
D * C = E
then w_cas = E.
rule-19: if phase = 1
then w_pcen = 0.
rule-20: if phase = 1
then d_pcen = 1
.
rule-21: if phase = 2
then w_pcen = .7273.
rule-22 : if phase = 2





rule-23 : if phase = 3
then w_pcen = .5778.
rule-24: if phase = 3
then d_pcen = .222.
rule-25: if pop_size = A and
cas_rate = B and
A * B = C
then num_cas = C.
rule-26: if mine_blood = WMB and
mine_drip = SS and
WMB * SS = X
then mine_need = X.
rule-27: if mine_type = yes
then mine_drip = 13.2.
rule-28: if mine_cas = WM and
mine_brate = TT and
WM * TT = WMB
then mine_blood = WMB.
rule-29: if mine_type = yes
then mine_brate = .4167
rule-30: if mine_type = yes
then mine_rate = .0711.
rule-31: if w_cas = E and
mine_rate = UU and
E * UU = WM
then mine_cas = WM.
rule-32: if gren_blood = WGB and
gren_drip = DD and
WGB * DD = K
then gren_need = K.
rule-33: if gren_type = yes
then gren_drip = 4.3.
rule-34: if gren_cas = WG and
gren_brate = EE and
WG * EE = WGB
then gren_blood = WGB.
rule-35: if gren_type = yes




rule-36: if gren_type = yes
then gren_rate = .0919.
rule-37: if w_cas = E and
gren_rate = FF and
E * FF = WG
then gren_cas = WG.
rule-38: if arty_blood = WAB and
arty_drip = GG and
WAB * GG = L
then arty_need = L.
rule-39: if arty_type = yes
then arty_drip = 3.7.
rule-40: if arty_cas = WA and
arty_brate = HH and
WA * HH = WAB
then arty_blood = WAB.
rule-41: if arty_type = yes
then arty_brate = .196.
rule-42: if arty__type = yes
then arty_rate = .40.
rule-43: if w_cas = E and
arty_rate =11 and
E * II = WA
then arty_cas = WA.
rule-44: if boob_blood = WBB and
boob_drip = JJ and
WBB * JJ = M
then boob_need = M.
rule-45: if boob_type = yes
then boob_drip = 10.46.
rule- 46: if boob_cas = WB and
boob_brate = KK and
WB * KK = WBB
then boob_blood = WBB.
rule-47: if boob_type = yes
then boob_brate = .32.
rule-48: if boob_type = yes




rule-49: if w_cas = E and
boob_rate = LL and
E * LL = WB
then boob_cas = WB
.
rule-50: if othr_blood = WOB and
othr_drip = MM and
WOB * MM = N
then othr_need = N.
rule-51: if othr_type = yes
then othr_drip = 3.0.
rule-52: if othr_cas = WO and
othr_brate = NN and
WO * NN = WOB
then othr_blood = WOB.
rule-53: if othr_type = yes
then othr_brate = . 125
rule-54: if othr_type = yes
then othr_rate = .0118
rule-55: if w_cas = E and
othr_rate = 00 and
E * 00 = WO
then othr_cas = WO.
rule-56: if bull_type = no
then bull_need = 0.
rule-57: if gren_type = no
then gren_need = .
rule-58: if arty_type = no
then arty_need = 0.
rule-59: if boob_type = no
then boob_need = .
rule-60: if othr_type = no
then othr_need = 0.
rule-61: if mine_type = no




/* Rules 62 to 68 compute an estimate of casualties
caused by multiple wounding agents, as determined by
historical data. This variable is automatically
included in all wounded blood requirements, and is
transparent to the user.
*/
rule-62: if z_blood = WZB and
z_drip = PP and
WZB * PP = P
then z_need = P
.
rule-63: if conflict
then z_drip = 5.27.







rule-65: if z_cas = WZ and
z_brate = QQ and
WZ * QQ = WZB
then z_blood = WZB.
rule-66: if conflict
then z_brate = .3729.
rule-67: if conflict
then z_rate = .0874.
rule-68: if w_cas = E and
z_rate = RR and
E * RR = WZ
then z_cas = WZ
/* Rules 69 thru 91 modify the previously derived
statisticial forecast for required blood by using
per cent increase or decrease factors obtained from a
Subject Matter Expert.
V
rule-69: if trans_dep = 1




rule-70: if trans_dep = 1 and
comp_blood_req = V and
trans_dep_effecta = LOW and
V * LOW = CCC
then transdep = CCC.
rule-71: if trans_dep = 2
then trans_dep_effectb = 0.
rule-72: if trans_dep = 2 and
comp_blood_req = V and
trans_dep_effectb = NEGA and
V * NEGA = CCC
then transdep = CCC.
rule- 73: if trans_dep = 3
then trans_dep_effectc = .20
rule-74: if trans_dep = 3 and
comp_blood_req = V and
trans_dep_effectc = ALF and
V * ALF = CCC
then transdep = CCC.
rule-75: if evac_policy = 1
then evac_effect = .0.
rule-76: if evac_policy = 2
then evac_effect = .0.
rule-77: if evac_policy = 3
then evac_effect = .20.
rule-78: if evac_policy = 4
then evac_effect = .35.
rule-79: if evac_policy = 5 or
evac_policy = 6
then evac effect = .65.
rule-80: if evac_effect = LONG and
comp_blood_req = V and
LONG * V = DDD
then evac_blood = DDD.
rule-81: if air_sup = no and
transport = 1




rule-82: if air_sup = no and
transport = 4 or
transport = 5
then air_sup_effeet = .20.
rule-83: if air_sup = yes
then air_sup_effect = .15.
rule-84: if stor_dep = yes
then stor_effect = 0.
rule-85: if stor_dep = no
then stor_effect = .15.
rule-86: if stor„effect = HAIR and
comp_blood_req = V and
HAIR * V = MMM
then stor_blood = MMM.
rule-87: if power_sup = yes
then power_result = 0.
rule-88: if power_sup = no
then power_result = .10.
rule-89: if power_result = JOLT and
comp_blood_req = V and
JOLT * V = NNN
then power_effect = NNN.
rule-90: if air_sup = no and
transport = 2 or
transport = 3 or
transport = 6 or
transport = 7
then air_sup_effeet = 0.
rule-91: if air_sup_effect = NUTS and
comp_blood_req = V and
V * NUTS = GGG
then air_blood = GGG.
rule-92: if blood_cap = HHH and
blood_on_hand = III and
HHH - III = JJJ
then blood room avail = JJJ.
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/******** DETERMINE STATISTICAL BLOOD FORECAST ************/
/************************************************************/
/*
The first several questions will be used
to obtain data necessary to formulate an
algorithmic statistical forecast for
blood requirements.
*/
/************* DETERMINE PHASE OF CONFLICT *******************/
/* Phase of conflict determines proportion of
total casualties which will be wounded, killed
or diseased.
V
question-1: enumeratedanswers ( phase )
.
question(phase) =
What phase of the conflict is it?
1. Phase I [ Transit to AOA ]
2. Phase II [ Amphibious Assault ]
3. Phase III [ Land Conflict ]
(Enter the number 1 thru 3 which applies)
legalvals(phase ) = [1,2,3].
/********* DETERMINE WHICH TYPES OF WEAPONS ENEMY IS USING
* * * * /
/* Different types of weapons result in





Is the enemy using bullet_type weapons such as
rifles, pistols, machine guns, etc.?'.
legalvals(bull_type) = [yes, no].
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/**************** DETERMINE POPULATION SIZE *****************/
/* Casualty estimates will be made by
multiplying the population size by
the per cent estimated casualties.
*/
question-3: question(pop_size) =




/**************** DETERMINE CASUALTY ESTIMATE ****************/
/* The casualty estimate is computed and
provided by the G - 1 section of the
overall command. MEDICAL PLANNERS
SHOULD OBTAIN THIS STATISTIC FROM G - 1.
*/
question-4: question( cas_rate ) =
What is the casualty estimate for friendly
forces expressed in decimal format?
(For example, 5% would be expressed as .05)'.




Is the enemy using grenade type weapons?'.
legalvals(gren_type) = [yes, no].
question-6: automaticmenu(mine_type )
question(mine_type) =
Is the enemy using land mines?'.
legalvals(mine_type) = [yes, no].
question-7: automaticmenu( arty_type)
question( arty_type ) =
Is the enemy using artillery or rockets?'.
legalvals( arty_type ) = [yes, no].
question-8: automaticmenu(boob_type)
question(boob_type) =
Is the enemy using any type of booby trap?'.
legalvals(boob_type ) = [yes, no].
question-9: question(othr_type) =
Is the enemy using any other
type of weapon such as knives, bayonets,
blow guns, etc.? [ yes or no ] '
.





/************** EXPERT KNOWLEDGE SECTION *******************/
/it************************************************************/
/* The following questions use knowledge
derived from a subject matter expert to
refine the statistical blood estimate
calculated in the first portion of this
system.
*/
question- 10: enumeratedanswer s ( transport )
.
question( transport) =







4. Air and Water
5. Air and Ground
6. Water and Ground
7. Air, Ground, and Water
(Enter appropriate number) '
.
legalvals( transport ) = [1,2,3,4,5,6,7].
question-11: question( trans_dep) =






legalvals( trans_dep) = [1,2,31.
question-12: enumeratedanswers ( evac_policy )
.
question(evac_policy ) =








6. 5 or more days






question- 13 : automaticmenu( stor_dep)
.
question ( stor_dep) =
Is the blood storage refrigeration equipment to
be used in a hardened AND environmentally
controlled facility?'.




Is the electrical power supply to the blood
storage refrigeration equipment:
- reliable?
- have circuit switching capability?
- on a monitored electrical circuit?
- have a reserve capacity?
If it has ALL of the above answer yes.
Otherwise, answer no . '
.
legalvals(power_sup) = [yes, no].
question-15: question(blood_cap) =
What is the total blood storage capability, in
units, for the friendly forces medical facilities
for whom the blood is intended?'.
legalvals(blood_cap) = integer.
question-16: question(blood_on_hand) =
H E M S
A Blood Requirements Planning System for use
by U.S. Navy Medical Units supporting











What is the total number of units of blood in
the friendly forces medical facilities which they will have
available in 72 hours?'. legalvals(blood_on_hand) = integer
question-17: question( air_sup) =
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TOTAL 673 166 929





























































TOTAL 673 191 1152































































TOTAL 675 159 1067
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